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Economic Integration in the Quality Ladder Model
 Eduardo CorrEia dE Souza 
Resumo
Realizamos aqui o mesmo tipo de “experimentos de integração” que em Rivera-Batiz e Romer (1991), 
desta vez no contexto de um modelo de “escada de qualidade”, onde integração via comércio internacional 
não é suficiente para impedir redundância de esforços de P&D. Daí que um tipo adicional de integração 
seja analisada: “integração financeira”.  Adotamos como arcabouço o “modelo Schumpeteriano Simples” 
de Aghion e Howitt (2005), cuja tecnologia de inovação difere claramente daquelas concebidas em Rivera-
Batiz e Romer (1991) por exibir retornos decrescentes de escala.
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Here we perform the same kind of “integration experiments” as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), this 
time in the context of a “quality ladder model”, where international trade integration is not enough to 
prevent redundancy of R&D efforts. Thus a further kind of integration is analysed: “financial market in-
tegration”. We adopt as a setup the Simple Schumpeterian Model in Aghion and Howitt (2005), whose 
innovation technology differs sharply from the ones conceived by Rivera-Batiz and Romer in that it displays 
decreasing returns to scale. 
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1 IntRoDuctIon
Here we perform the same kind of “integration experiments” as in Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer (1991), this time in the context of a “quality ladder” endogenous growth 
model. In that latter paper, based on a “variety expansion” endogenous growth 
model,1 flows of goods or flows of ideas (depending on the specification of research 
technology) between countries was all that was required to promote an increase in 
the long run world growth rate, thus taking advantage of increasing returns to scale 
displayed by the reduced form production functions of designs for new products. 
The problem of redundancy or duplication of R&D efforts was naturally circumven-
ted by a kind of “axiom of choice” underlying the rationality of innovators: there 
exists complete information in the sense that potential innovators know, previously 
from their having come into being, all the possible varieties of goods, so that they 
can choose which one they are going to try to innovate and avoid choosing the same 
that another innovator is targeting. As Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) put it:
In the pursuit of monopoly rents, researchers in the two countries will 
specialize in the production of different types of designs and avoid re-
dundancy, so the worldwide stock of designs will ultimately be twice as 
large as the stock that has been produced in either country.2 
This presumption cannot be expected to apply to a quality-ladder model, where the 
set of goods targeted to be innovated is bounded. In our setup the coordination 
required to prevent duplication can only be brought about by what we call “financial 
market integration”: research activity is financed not by retained profits at firms’ 
level but by individuals’ savings in exchange for shares of potential monopolist 
firms; although it is not possible to prevent Bertrand competition driving profits 
to zero after simultaneous innovations happen, the financial market is capable of 
supporting/implementing any number of potential innovators per good so as to 
maximize the total return to shares. Thus, for example with the probability that a 
simultaneous innovation occurs when independent researchers aim the same good 
being given by the product of the individual probabilities, then it will never be the 
case that in an integrated capital market more than one firm receives resources to 
innovate on a given good when R&D technology (whose output is a probability of 
innovating) displays constant or increasing returns to scale.
 
1 Grossman and Helpman (1991) introduced the terminology “quality ladder” as opposed to “variety 
expansion” endogenous growth models. In the first case a bounded, constant measure set of goods 
are quality improved through innovation; in the second case, the set of goods is expanded through 
innovation.
2 Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991, p. 543).
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Still, as long as capital is not internationally mobile and investment in each country 
is uniformly widespread through the usual unitary measure or finite set of goods, 
there will always remain two firms bound to simultaneously innovate. Although 
this latter is a central feature of our present model, the particular phenomenon of 
duplication of R&D efforts analysed here will emerge as a result of the interaction of 
other factors such as the “free flows of ideas” and the regime of Intellectual Property 
Rights. 
Because of the very assumption that one country will always be an integrated finan-
cial market, we cannot speak here of “atomistic agents” for whom there are (as if) 
constant returns to R&D while there are actually diminishing returns from a social 
standpoint, as is the case in Jones and Williams (1999). Accordingly, we incorpo-
rate the fortuitous event of duplication in the innovators’ maximization problem, 
what may in some cases revert the tendency of “patent races” to generate overinvest-
ment. 
The setup we choose to work with is Aghion and Howitt (2005) handbook’s. It 
proves not only easy to handle for our purposes, as it generates some ambiguous 
results not found in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). For example, because of inter-
nationally different levels of protection to Intellectual Property, there is no guarantee 
that this particular lab equipment specification of R&D technology3 will generate 
a positive growth effect under trade integration. Thanks to the simple functional 
forms adopted by Aghion and Howitt (2005) in their handbook’s Schumpeterian 
model, it will be in general possible to predict when one effect of integration (say, 
trade enabling producers to take advantage of increasing returns to innovation, the 
“market size effect”) will outweigh the other effect (say, increased competition with 
competitive fringes worldwide).
Now, several people have already used endogenous growth models, or more specifi-
cally the quality ladder model, in an international context to investigate integration-
related problems. Gancia (2003) used a quality ladder model whose final goods 
present gross substitutability and assumed that the South (or developing countries’ 
block) provides weaker IPRs protection to study how trade integration promotes 
“innovation diversion” and “stagnation” effects: With international financial capital 
or knowledge mobility existing prior to trade, each country produces the whole 
range of goods and therefore innovators, serving the world economy, obtain both 
the high rents from the North and the low rents from the South independent from 
3 Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) call “lab equipment R&D technology” one in which R&D uses the 
same inputs as the final good’s production, or directly the final good as the only input. As opposed to 
this, they call “knowledge-driven R&D technology” one in which the inputs are the stock of knowledge 
and human capital, while in the production of final good what is used is capital and/or unskilled labour. 
In this latter case, the analysis has to be carried through a two sectors’ model. 
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the good they target. Under free trade, instead, the North and South blocks spe-
cialize according to comparative advantages and returns to innovation will depend 
on which good is targeted, so that technical change is shifted in favor of Northern 
countries, raising their productivity and making them relatively richer. But as rela-
tive wages (North/South) raise, comparative advantage is continually displaced to 
the South, so more and more sectors move to the South where IPRs protection and 
returns to R&D are smaller, thereby eroding global incentives to innovation.
Taylor (1994) studied the impact of a change from symmetric to asymmetric IPRs 
protection on the global rate of growth, so that unlike Gancia (2003) he was deal-
ing with the general problem of (absence of) international financial capital mobility 
instead of focusing on North-South differences. To Taylor, asymmetric protection 
meant not only that R&D and production of a certain good have to be performed 
in the same country/location, but also that patents are granted/recognized in a 
certain country inasmuch who applies for them are domestic firms. (And this same 
regime holds in the home country and in the rest of the world alike). Therefore, his 
picture of asymmetric protection amounts to exactly the same thing as our case of 
international trade in the absence of financial integration.
Finally, Aghion and Howitt (2005) use their basic framework, which we adopt here, 
to study convergence clubs, that is, why some countries tend to display a common 
positive productivity growth rate in the long run while others will stagnate. To do 
this, they follow Howitt’s (2000) model with intersectoral as well as international 
knowledge spillovers. Intersectoral spillovers simply imply that we may work as with 
an aggregate (one sector) model. The international spillover or technology transfer, 
as Aghion and Howitt (2005) put it, “allows a backward sector in one country to 
catch up with the current technological frontier whenever it innovates. The further 
behind the frontier a country is initially, the bigger the average size of its innova-
tions, and therefore the higher its growth rate for a given frequency of innovations. 
As long as the country continues to innovate [with some positive frequency], no 
matter how small, it will eventually grow at the same rate as the leading countries. 
(Otherwise the gap would continue to rise and therefore the country’s growth rate 
would continue to rise). However, countries with poor macroeconomic conditions, 
legal environment, educational system or credit markets will not innovate in equilib-
rium and therefore they will not benefit from technology transfer, but will instead 
stagnate.”4
So why our paper? In the first place, both Taylor (1994) and Gancia (2003) used 
Ricardian Comparative Advantage models, which naturally rules out the possibility 
of international duplication of R&D efforts. In Taylor, what we call here “financial 
4  Aghion and Howitt (2005, p. 9).
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integration” amounts only to render the best R&D technology available to innova-
tors worldwide. Here we also have this same effect, but “financial integration” fur-
ther stands out as the level of integration (beyond knowledge spillovers and trade) 
required to prevent duplication. Second, with relation to international knowledge 
spillovers, our conception is different from Howitt’s (2000). There, the free inter-
national flow of ideas makes the technology frontier available to potential innova-
tors, while here it becomes available to final good producers directly. Last but not 
least, we think our work differs from the above mentioned international economy 
applications of the quality ladder model in that it bears the same spirit of Rivera-
Batiz and Romer’s (1991) integration experiments: it is a step-by-step integration 
analysis, where we first have international knowledge spillovers but not trade nor 
financial (capital mobility) integration; then we investigate what changes when we 
add trade to the picture but yet without financial integration, and so on. We think 
it is worth while repeating Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s (1991) integration experiments 
this time using Aghion and Howitt’s (2005) model among other things because 
this last setup’s innovation technology differs sharply from the ones conceived by 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer in that it displays decreasing returns to scale.
A last word of warning: although it will be impossible not to deal with “distor-
tions”  (wedges between private and social returns to innovation) such as the one at 
the root of the so called “creative destruction effect”, our concern here is only with 
the “mechanism” of integration, not with welfare properties of the model or how 
(much) integration may per se eliminate or attenuate distortions5. The next section 
presents Aghion and Howitt’s (2005) simple Schumpeterian model, whose outcome 
is the steady state growth rate for an autarky; the subsequent sections add up further 
levels of international economic integration. 
2  tHE BasIc sEtuP: aGHIon anD HoWItt’s (2005) sIMPlE scHuMPE-
tERIan MoDEl6
There are two kinds of goods in the economy: a final good and m different interme-
diate inputs. The only production factor is (skilled) labour. Time is discrete, indexed 
by t = 1,2,..., and there is a mass l of individuals, each endowed with one unit of 
skilled labor that she supplies inelastically. The final good is produced competitively 
using the intermediate inputs and labor, according to the production function:
5 The reader interested on those welfare aspects of innovation, especially distortions under “patent races” 
should consult Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) and Stokey (1995).
6 This section merely reproduces, with a few minor changes, Aghion and Howitt’s (2005, section 2.2) 
text. 
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where each xit is the flow of intermediate input i used at date t, and ait is a produc-
tivity variable that measures the quality of the input. The final good is used in turn 
for consumption, research, and producing the intermediate inputs.
The economy’s average growth rate g will be the expected growth rate of any given 
productivity variable. Measuring discrete-time growth rates as log differences, we 
have:
 ( ), 1ln ln ln      it i t itg E A A E A−= − ≡ ∆   (2)
Accordingly we focus now on one representative intermediate sector, eliminating 
the i subscript for notational simplicity.7
Innovations result in improved versions of the intermediate input. More precisely, 
each innovation at t multiplies the pre-existing productivity parameter at-1 of the 
best available input by a factor γ > 1. Innovations in turn result from research. If 
nt units of the final good are invested at the beginning of the period, some indivi-
dual can become the new “leading-edge” producer of the intermediate input with 
probability
  λ ⋅ f ( nt ),  f ‘> 0 ,  f ‘’ < 0 ,  f (0) = 0  (3)
where λ is a research productivity parameter and nt ≡ (nt /(γ.at-1)) is the productivity-
adjusted R&D expenditure in the sector. We divide by γ.at-1, the targeted productivi-
ty parameter, to take into account the “fishing-out” effect - on average each quality 
improvement is harder to bring about than the previous one.
Assume the time period is short enough that we may ignore the possibility of more 
than one successful innovator in the same sector. Then:
 lnAt=  lnAt-1+ lnγ with probability λ .f(n)
7 That being so, the reader may wonder why we use a functional form with m intermediate goods in 
expression (1) above. The reason is simply that we adopt Aghion and Howitt’s (2005) framework, 
which originally was intended to be quite general and comprehensive – for example, it gives room to 
analysing trade in intermediate goods and innovation in a “variety expansion” fashion (with m growing 
over time), none of which are studied here.
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 lnAt-1        with probability         1 − λ .f(n)  (4)
 According to (2) and (4) the average growth rate is:
 g = λ . f(n) . lnγ  (5)
in an equilibrium where productivity-adjusted research is a constant n. The growth 
rate, therefore, results from λ.f(n), representing the frequency of innovation, and 
lnγ, representing the incremental size of innovations.
The model determines research n, and therefore the growth rate g, using a research 
arbitrage equation that equates the expected cost and benefit of research. The payoff 
to research is the prospect of a monopoly rent πt if the research succeeds in produ-
cing an innovation. This rent lasts for one period only, as all individuals can imitate 
the current technology next period. Hence the expected benefit from spending one 
unit on research is the marginal probability λ . f ‘(n) / (γat-1) times πt . Taking the 
final good as numeraire, the research arbitrage condition becomes
 1 = λ . f ‘ (n) .(πt /At)  (6)
To solve this equation for n we need to determine the productivity-adjusted mono-
poly rent πt /at to a successful innovator. This innovator can produce the leading-
edge intermediate input at a constant marginal cost of one unit of the final good. 
But she faces a competitive fringe of imitators who can produce the same input at a 
constant marginal cost χ , where 11, χ∈ α 
 . The parameter χ is an inverse measure 
of the degree of product market competition or imitation in the economy.8 The 
innovator is forced to charge a limit price (in terms of the final good, our numeraire) 
equal to:
 pt = χ 
 to prevent the fringe from stealing her market. Hence the monopoly rent is:
 πt = (pt -1).xt = (χ -1).xt (7)
Because the final-good producing sector is competitive, xt is determined by the 
marginal productivity condition:
8 If no innovation succeeds then some firm will produce domestically but with no cost advantage over 
the fringe because everyone is able to produce last period’s intermediate input at a constant marginal 
cost of unity. Therefore, profits due to innovation last only one period.
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 pt = χ = ∂yt /∂xt = α(mxt /AtL)α -1  (8)
That is, the monopolist’s output xt is the amount of intermediate good demanded 
by firms in the final good sector when they are faced with the price χ . So (8) sim-
ply states that xt must be such that the marginal product of the intermediate good 
equates its price.
Solving (8) for xt and substituting in (7):
 πt = δ(χ)At L/m  (9)
where
 δ(χ) ≡ (χ -1).(χ /α)1/(α -1), δ’(χ)> 0 (10)
Thus we can write the research arbitrage equation (6), taking into account that 
1t tA A−γ ⋅ =  because a monopolist is someone who has just innovated, as:
 1 = λ. f ‘(n).(χ -1).(χ/α)1/(α -1) . L/m (11)
which we assume to have a single positive solution for n. If the research-productivity 
function f takes the simple form: f(n) = 2n , then
  ( )
2 2
122 1 1    
2
Ln
m
α−χ   = λ ⋅ ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅   α   
  (11’)  
The average growth rate is determined by substituting (11’) into the growth equa-
tion (5) :
 g = λ 2n  lnγ = λ² (χ-1)(χ/α)1/(α -1)(L/m) lnγ  (12)
Aghion and Howitt (2005) show that (12) is not only the average growth rate of 
each intermediate good sector’s productivity parameter, but also approximately the 
growth rate of the economy’s per capita GDP.
comparative statics on Growth
Equation (12) delivers several comparative statics results, each with important policy 
implications on how to “manage” the growth process:
Eduardo correia de souza 857
Est. econ., são Paulo, 38(4): 849-871, out-dez 2008
Growth increases with the productivity of innovations λ and with the supply of 
skilled labor l: both results point to the importance of education and particularly 
higher education as a growth-enhancing device. Indeed countries that invest more 
in higher education will both achieve a higher productivity of research activities 
and also reduce the (opportunity) cost of R&D by increasing the aggregate supply 
of skilled labor. An increase in the size of population should also bring about an 
increase in growth by raising l. This result amounts to the famous “scale effect” 
criticised by Jones (1995).
Growth increases with the size of innovations, as measured by γ. This in turn points 
to the existence of a wedge between private and social innovation incentives: if given 
the choice between increasing the frequency λ or increasing their size γ, the private 
individual will go for increasing frequency as size does not affect the expected re-
turns to R&D as expressed on the right side of equation (11); however, equation 
(12) shows that small innovations, with γ close to one, will result in slow growth. 
This is an instance of the so-called “creative destruction effect”: each new innovator 
builds on the previous innovator’s result, but all she cares about is the monopoly 
power resulting from quality differentiation, not at all how big the quality impro-
vement was. Other things constant, this leads to decentralised (market) equilibrium 
over-investment in R&D. 
Growth is decreasing with the degree of product market competition and/or with 
the degree of imitation as inversely measured by χ. Thus patent protection (or, more 
generally, better protection of intellectual property rights), will enhance growth by 
increasing χ and therefore potential rewards from innovation. Conversely, a com-
petition policy will tend to discourage innovation and growth by reducing χ and 
thereby forcing incumbent innovators to charge a lower limit price.9 
3 IntEGRatIon as FREE FloW oF IDEas
3.1 Knowledge spillovers, IPRs and simultaneous Innovations
Building on Aghion and Howitt (2005) handbook’s simple Schumpeterian growth 
model, we first consider a world with potentially free flows of ideas, no trade in 
goods and symmetric as to access but internationally different levels of Intellectual 
9 This feature of the first generation Schumpeterian endogenous growth models is subject to qualifica-
tion. As Aghion and Howitt (2005, p.8) put it, “Existing historical evidence supports the view that property 
rights protection is important for sustained long-run growth; however the prediction that competition should be 
unambiguously bad for innovations and growth is questioned by all recent empirical studies...” 
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Property Rights. Consider first the case where IPRs are not product-patent like; 
instead, they work as a system of prohibition claims: whenever and wherever an 
innovation happens, it instantaneously becomes common knowledge in any country 
if the innovator does not recur to that country’s IPRs system, which then (and only 
then) imposes a certain cost on potential imitators for one period only. Without the 
possibility of licensing and without trade in goods, home country’s innovators have 
no claims on profits earned by imitators abroad, so they will recur only to local 
IPRs protection. Since new knowledge is then free abroad, foreign imitators engage 
in Bertrand’s competition driving prices to average/marginal cost. This latter cost is 
assumed to be identical to the cost faced by innovators, being given, say, by techno-
logy; what amounts to say that mark-ups or limiting prices against the fringes of 
imitators ( sχ  below) are solely determined by the extent of IPRs protection in each 
country. 
In such a framework, when a simultaneous innovation occurs in two different 
countries, each country’s imitators are free to copy from abroad,10 causing the lo-
cal innovators a total loss. This takes for granted a non cooperative behaviour on 
the part of innovators, what is a reasonable assumption as long as we suppose that 
financial innovative capital is not internationally mobile. As a result, at any period 
there will be two production levels of intermediate goods: if they were innovated 
only at home, they are priced according to a non-competitive mark-up; otherwise 
they are competitively priced and supplied. 
In this world, not only innovations performed anywhere add to the world’s techno-
logical frontier, as they are always instantaneously and one by one absorbed or made 
available to local final good producers. So there is no “catching-up story” like in 
Aghion and Howitt’s (2005) section 3.1 on “technology transfer”: In this latter 
paper, as well as in Howitt’s (2000) original setup, international knowledge spillo-
vers are “indirect” in that they accrue first to potential innovators, not to final good 
producers. At time t in a given country, if no innovation occurred, final good pro-
ducers have to fare with that country’s “low” old productivity level A j,t-1 in interme-
diate good j, a productivity level that may be very far from the world technology 
frontier , 1j tA −  . However, it is on that , 1j tA −  world frontier basis that local innovators 
work to improve on, so that in case the innovation at time t is successful this coun-
try jumps the whole distance , 1 , 1j t j tA A− −−  as an externality, plus the one-step-size 
current improvement.11 
10 For they (imitators) can sustain they are drawing the relevant information from the foreign innova-
tor, who has made no prohibitionist claim against disclosing his “secret” in the home country’s IPR 
system.
11 Yet, reading section 2 above, we realise that Aghion and Howitt (2005) adopt also a knowledge spillo-
ver to final good producers at national level when they assume that after one period the state-of-the-art 
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Finally, we are explicitly doing away with last section’s assumption that the time 
period is short enough so that we can ignore the possibility of more than one suc-
cessful innovator in the same sector. Actually, what we are considering is a situation 
such that, from the point of view not necessarily of the technological discoveries the-
mselves, but of the economically relevant accruing of extraordinary profits through 
IPRs protection, it is as if simultaneous innovations occurred. La Manna, Macleod 
and Meza (1989) argue that, as matter of fact, something like that is already in 
course in many countries, including the US Patent and Trademark Office, which are 
adopting the “secrecy period” procedure, by which from the time of the first appli-
cation for a given patent until its judgement/publication more applicants are allowed 
to enter the process, with the provision that during this period technical details of 
the submitted applications are kept secret. This system gives origin not necessarily to 
monopolies only, but possibly to oligopolies too and, in our framework, to Bertrand 
competition driving profits to zero. 
3.2 the simple schumpeterian Model with Duplication
If nt units of the final good are invested at the beginning of period t, the home 
country’s potential innovator can become the new “leading-edge” producer of the 
intermediate input with probability
  mtD λ . f (nt) – λ . f (nt) . λ * . f (nt*) (13)
That is, the probability that he innovates minus the probability of a simultaneous 
innovation under independent innovative efforts. If a simultaneous innovation oc-
curs, his profits are driven to zero and production is carried out by home country’s 
imitators of the foreign identical technology. Expression (13) takes for granted that 
in running many small innovative firms the loss due to duplication “outweighs” 
the gain from exploring decreasing returns in individual firm’s technologies to the 
point that, in each national integrated capital market such as defined in section 1, 
it is optimal to run only one R&D project for each intermediate good.12 Since we 
do not yet assume trade in intermediate goods, the research arbitrage conditions 
involve, for each innovator, only profits earned in domestic markets:
intermediate good can be imitated.
12 For more details on that issue, see the beginning of section 5 below. At this point we observe that the 
existence of only one firm as potential innovator in each country doesn’t exclude free entry. One may 
think of free entry in our “integrated financial market” in the following terms: if for the marginal unit 
of final good allocated to R&D the expected value of a firm is bigger than the cost of innovation, then 
the financial market is not able to prevent side independent investment; but that would on its turn drive 
firms’ values below the cost of innovation.
Est. econ., são Paulo, 38(4): 849-871, out-dez 2008
860 Economic Integration in the Quality ladder Model
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
*
1
'
1 1 * *
    and                                              
' *
1 * 1 *
t
t t
t
t
t t
t
f n
f n
A
f n
f n
A
−
−

 = λ ⋅ ⋅ − λ ⋅ ⋅π  γ ⋅


  = λ ⋅ ⋅ − λ ⋅ ⋅π  γ ⋅
  (14) 
analogous to (6) above
With
  ( )t t LA mπ = δ χ ⋅ ⋅    and    ( )
** * *t t
LA
m
π = δ χ ⋅ ⋅   (15)
Substituting (15) in (14), adopting the functional form ( ) 2f n n= ⋅  and solving 
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where the subscript D stands for “duplication” and n on the right side of the second 
equality is the productivity adjusted R&D expenditure under complete isolation, 
defined in section 2 above, expression (11’). As to the term Dε ,
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2
 1 *    1  Dε = − λ ⋅ • <  (17)
since [ ]( ) ( ) 1 *  1 * *Df n− λ ⋅ • = − λ ⋅ , the probability that an innovation does not 
occur abroad. Thus   Dn n< : In the absence of market extension gains from trade 
integration, and with free flows of information bringing about the possibility of a 
total loss whenever duplication occurs, each innovator will allocate less resources to 
R&D if compared to the former complete isolation situation. To calculate the rate 
of growth under “duplication”, gD, first notice that under the assumptions regarding 
13 An entirely analogous expression holds for the rest of the world (*).
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knowledge spillovers we made, every country will be growing at this same rate. 
Then,
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
D
1 1
ln  max , * ln  ,   with  probab.
* *  - * *
  
ln  max , *                                                                                          (18)
ln  max , *  ,    w
t t
D D D D
t t
t t
A A
f n f n f n f n
A A
A A
− −
− −
+ γ
m ≡ λ ⋅ + λ ⋅ λ ⋅ ⋅λ ⋅
=
ith probab.    1
     
D






 − m



  (18)
where Dm  is the probability that an innovation happens either in the home country 
(    ) or abroad ( * ). 
Then
 ( )( ) ( )1 1ln max , * ln max , * lnD t t t t Dg E A A A A− −≡ − = m ⋅ γ
Under ( ) 2f n n= ⋅  and by (16)
 ( 2 * * 2 * * * * 2) lnD D D D Dg n n n n= λ ⋅ ε ⋅ + λ ⋅ ε ⋅ − λ ⋅λ ⋅ ε ⋅ε ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ γ   (19)
Given this expression, comparing to g (the home country’s growth rate at isolation) 
in section 2, expression (12) above, a first question arises: which is the prevailing 
effect on the rate of growth: the positive effect due to the free flow of ideas (kno-
wledge spillovers) or the negative effect via the reduced allocation of resources to 
R&D in face of duplication?
Calling for notational simplicity * and pp  the probabilities that each country in-
novates (a discovery is made) under “isolation” , and  Dp  and 
*
Dp  the same for 
“duplication”, so that D Dp p= ⋅ ε  , we have
* * * *     D D D D D Dg g p p p p p p> ⇔ m > ⇔ ⋅ ε + ⋅ ε − ⋅ ε ⋅ ⋅ ε >   (20)
Next, recalling that * *  1       1D Dp pε = − > −  since 
* *  Dn n> , and alike for *Dε , 
a sufficient condition for (20) to hold is
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( )
*
**  1 1
p pp p
p p p
⋅⋅ − >
− + ⋅
 (21)
Ignoring third order and smaller terms in (21), a sufficient condition for (20) to hold 
is simply 
1  
3
p <  . That is, irrespective how much the rest of the world innovates, 
whenever the home country does not innovate too much under isolation, the positive 
integration effect via free flow of ideas will prevail.
Under more standard patent protection and with no trade yet, never mind what 
innovators abroad do an innovator can guarantee that he will be, for one period, 
the only producer of the new generation of the intermediate good in his country’s 
market. Therefore, the amounts n and n* allocated to R&D are the same as under 
isolation, expression (11’) above, and the growth rate is given simply by
  ( 2 * 2 * * * 2) lnDPg n n n n= λ ⋅ + λ ⋅ − λ ⋅λ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ γ  (22)
or, using the above notation for probabilities,
  ( * *) ln     lnDPg p p p p p g= + − ⋅ ⋅ γ > ⋅ γ =
where the subscript P stands for “patent protection”. In this case the effect of “free 
f lows of ideas” is unambiguously an increase in the growth rate: DPg g> . 
Duplication supervenes simply as the overlapping in research efforts already existing 
when the two economies were isolated. Under “integration”, each economy starts 
benefiting from what the other made of different.
The analogy with the variety-expansion, lab equipment specification of R&D model 
of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991, p. 549) is that as trade is responsible there for 
making all the worldwide existing types of capital equipment available to be used in 
all research activities undertaken anywhere, here knowledge spillovers guarantee that 
only worldwide ultimate generations of all the intermediate goods are used in final 
good’s production everywhere, increasing the productivity of a given/fixed stock of 
labour allocated to it.14 However, we are far yet from the operation of an integrated 
research sector; actually, it is the very presence of knowledge spillovers that makes 
duplication, a kind of simultaneous redundancy in research, bound to happen. In 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) all that is needed to remove this latter inefficiency 
is trade in intermediate goods, what we incorporate next. 
14  Recall expression (1) above.
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4 IntEGRatIon vIa tRaDE In IntERMEDIatE GooDs
When a firm is the only in the world that has discovered how to produce the state-
of-the-art of an intermediate good, it will earn profits equal to
 ( ) ( )min 1 *Gt t tx xπ = χ − ⋅ +  (23)
Where the subscript “G” stands for “global”, ( )min min , *χ = χ χ  is the limit price it 
can charge when free and instantaneous flows of ideas enables imitation to be car-
ried at the internationally minimal cost,15 and the terms x and x* are the demands 
for the intermediate good given by the condition that its price be equal to its value 
marginal productivity, namely
 
1 1
1 1
min min
1 1
1 1
min
*   
*
 
*and      *                                     (24)
t t
t t
t t
t t
y y Lx A
x x m
Lx A
m
−α α−
−α α−
∂ ∂χ = = ⇒ = ⋅ ⋅α ⋅χ
∂ ∂
= ⋅ ⋅α ⋅χ
 (24)
where it is assumed, accordingly, *t tA A=  
So that, using (24) in (23),
 
( )
1 1
1 1
min min
* 1Gt t
L L A
m
−α α−+π = ⋅ ⋅α ⋅χ ⋅ χ −   (25)
The familiar research arbitrage conditions are, in this case,
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
1
*
*
1
'
1 1
and
'
1 1
t
t Gt
t
t
t Gt
t
f n
f n
A
f n
f n
A
−
−
  = λ ⋅ ⋅ − λ ⋅ ⋅π  γ ⋅


  = λ ⋅ ⋅ − λ ⋅ ⋅π  γ ⋅
  (26)
recalling that 1t tA A −= ⋅ γ
15 When trade takes place domestic firms decide to seek for foreign protection in order to avoid competi-
tion in the form of exports from imitators.
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Adopting again the functional form ( ) 2f n n=  , using (25) in (26), and then 
solving (26) for nt , comes
( ) ( ) [ ]
( )
*
22 * * *2min
min
2 2*12 min
min
1 1 2 1 2 1
2
1
TD TD
L Ln n
m
L L
m
α−
  χ +  = λ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅λ ⋅ λ ⋅ − λ ⋅ ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅ + λ ⋅ • ⋅   α    
 χ + ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅  α   
  (27)
where the subscripts t and D stand respectively for “trade” and “duplication”. 
Expression (27) can be rewritten, again, for notational simplicity,
( )
2 2*122 min
min
1 1    ;     1      
2TD TD TD
L Ln
m
α−  χ + = λ ⋅ ⋅ε ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅ ε <  α   
   (28)
with an entirely analogous expression holding for 
*
TDn . Now TDε  is analogous to 
Dε  from (16) or (17) above, so that ( )1 * *TD TDf nε = − λ ⋅ .
The corresponding growth rate will be
* * * * ( 2 2 2 2 ) lnTD TD TD TD TDg n n n n= λ ⋅ ⋅ + λ ⋅ ⋅ − λ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅λ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ γ   (29)
Next, compare   and  nD TDn , respectively the equilibrium allocation of resources to 
R&D under “free and instantaneous flow of ideas” (or “duplication without trade”) 
and the corresponding allocation when we add trade in intermediate goods to the 
picture. From (16) and (28), and using the same notation as in (20) or (21), 
comes
 ( ) ( )
2 2
12 2* 2 11 1
2D D
Ln p
m
α−χ   = − ⋅λ ⋅ ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅   α    '  
and
 
( ) ( )
2 2*12 2* 2 min
min
11 1
2TD TD
L Ln p
m
α−  χ + = − ⋅λ ⋅ ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅  α   
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where the subscript “TD” stands for “trade and duplication”. On the right side 
of each expression above, the first term is of order < 1, as a probability, and then 
raised to 2, so it can be ignored. Assuming that both l and l* are equal or bigger 
than 1, trade integration will result in a bigger allocation of resources to R&D and 
therefore in faster growth as long as the positive “market size effect” (an innovator 
selling to the world market instead of to the local only) outweighs the negative 
effect from increased competition (an innovator having to establish a limiting price 
according to the world’s most competitive fringe, that is, according to the lowest 
level of IPRs).16
5 FInancIal MaRKEt IntEGRatIon
To begin with, we state the problem of allocating resources to R&D in an integrated 
financial market where: the research activity is supported not by retained profits at 
the firms level but by individual savings in exchange for shares of potential inno-
vative firms; simultaneous innovations are bound to happen whenever there exist 
two or more firms targeting an intermediate good to be quality improved; althou-
gh it is not possible to prevent Bertrand competition driving profits to zero after 
simultaneous innovations happen, the financial market is capable of supporting/
implementing any number of potential innovators per good so as to maximize the 
total return to shares; investors maximize expected returns; there is symmetry in 
intermediate goods’ profitability. 
Maximizing the probability that an innovation occurs in a certain industry involves 
two simultaneous choices: of the number of identical firms within the industry; of 
the total amount of resources (units of final good) allocated to that industry. If in 
equilibrium two industries, say i and j , present R&D activity, then it must be the 
case that
 
,     and JI
I J
PP i j
N N
∂∂ = ∀
∂ ∂
  (30)
where I ≡ the set of potential innovators in industry i ;
16 We suppose that the binding condition in setting a mark-up is the imitation cost given by the level of 
IPRs and not the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. If the mark-up according to the 
elasticity of substitution were smaller than that according to the minimal imitation cost, then growth 
under trade integration would be unambiguously bigger. This artifice of mark-ups given by imitation 
costs and not elasticities of substitution is employed for example in Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti 
(2003), presumably because it makes growth performance liable to depend on policies which affect the 
degree of competition/IPRs.
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( )  #I i i
i I
N n I n
∈
= = ⋅∑  ≡ the number of final good’s units allocated to innovation 
in industry i; 
 
I ie
i I
P p
∈
= ∑   (31)
 
( ) ( )
{} ( )        
                  ie i i k k
k i I
p p n p n
∈ ∩℘
= − ≡∏  
≡ the probability that an innovation occurs exclusively at firm i within industry I, 
when firms in I carry on independent research efforts, so that the probability of 
intersections or simultaneous innovations is given by the product of individual pro-
babilities ( )i ip n , which in turn are functions only of the amount of resources em-
ployed at firm level, displaying decreasing returns ( )( ) '' 0 i ip n < .
Condition (30) presupposes that given the optimal number of firms inside each 
industry, functions such as PI display decreasing returns in nI , so that there is inter-
industries diversification in R&D. The summation of ns over industries must, in 
equilibrium, equate total savings. Expressions in (31) reveal a trade-off between 
exploring decreasing returns at firms level (what would recommend scattering re-
sources through many firms within an industry) and incurring in duplication (what 
happens on a 2 per 2 basis when there are 2 firms in an industry, on combinations 
of 2 per 2 and 3 per 3 basis when there are 3 firms, and so on)17. Under Aghion and 
Howitt’s (2005) functional form ( ) 2 i i ip n n= λ ⋅ , the constraint that investment in 
R&D is liable to “lower bound indivisibilities”, namely that ( )2 1in ≥ − λ , ensures 
that, whatever is nI , PI displays decreasing returns in #( I ), the number of firms in 
I, so that in an integrated financial market there will be only one firm being finan-
ced to innovate on an intermediate industry. Another way to guarantee this same 
result is to assume, in general, an upper limit to the number of firms that can, in a 
given country, target the same good to be innovated and that accumulation has been 
going on for time enough to make the amount of resources (units of final good) 
allocated to R&D in each good big. 
Returning to our international context, when besides free flows of ideas, trade in 
intermediate goods and an internationally integrated market for R&D financing 
17 It is interesting to notice that in situations in which it pays off to run many small projects, maximisa-
tion of returns to R&D depend on non cummulativeness of knowledge. If knowledge is cummulative 
so that for example only the last firm which innovated on a certain good can perform the next quality 
jump, of course this firm has a stake in not making this knowledge available in the financial market.
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there is also licensing (that is, R&D located in one country and intermediate goods 
production in another country), only the most effectual innovation technologies, as 
parameterised by λ in expression (3) above, will be employed.18 The allocation of 
resources to R&D will be given by
( ) [ ]
2 2*1* 2 2 min
min
1max ,  1  
2F
L Ln
m
α−  χ +  = λ λ ⋅ ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅    α   
   (32) 
where the subscript F stands for “financial integration”
The corresponding common growth rate will be
( ) ( ){ } ( ) [ ]
1
*1* * 2 min
minmax , ln max ,  1 lnF F
L Lg f n
m
α−
  χ +   = λ λ ⋅ ⋅ γ = λ λ ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ γ     α     
   (33)
From (29), recall that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * * *    lnTD TD TD TD TDg f n f n f n f n= λ ⋅ + λ ⋅ − λ ⋅ ⋅λ ⋅ ⋅ γ
and
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
*12 min
min
1
*1* *2 *min
min
1
1
TD TD
TD TD
L Lf n
m
L Lf n
m
α−
α−
χ + λ ⋅ = λ ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ε α 
χ + λ ⋅ = λ ⋅ χ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ε α 
    (34)
When compared to gTD given by (29), gF given by (33) represents a more efficient 
outcome of a laissez faire world economy in the sense that, given a world aggregate 
allocation *n n+  of resources to R&D, there is no loss due to duplication - to make 
an analogy, one may say that the introduction of financial integration has a positive 
“total factor productivity effect” on research. While, through comparing (32) and 
(28) where there appears terms like TDε , we see that the absence of financial inte-
gration has also a negative effect on the allocated amount of resources to innova-
tion.19 However, for perfectly plausible values of the parameters and of *  and  TD TDε ε  
18 See for example Taylor (1994, p. 365): one of the consequences of the absence of international financial 
capital mobility is the employment of “less than best techniques”. 
19 We make this analogy bearing in mind Benhabib and Spiegel’s (2000) decomposition of the effect of 
financial development on GNP growth in “total factor productivity” and “factor accumulation” (allo-
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it may be the case that gtD > gF , reflecting the well known fact that duplication and 
patent races lead to overinvestment in R&D.20 In our setup, however, it may also be 
the case that gtD < gF , when countries are already innovating too much and
( ) ( ) ( )( )* * *max , max  1  , 1   1 2     or    1TD TD TD TD TD TDp p p pε ε = − − < + >    (35)
where, as in (21) above, TDp  denotes the probability that an innovation is indepen-
dently made at the home country in the context of absence of f inancial 
integration.
This latter possibility arises here because we don’t assume, like Jones and Williams 
(1999) that there is a wedge between “physical” productivity of R&D as perceived 
by atomistic innovators and as perceived from the society’s standpoint.21 In other 
words, here innovators make their allocation decisions fully incorporating the pos-
sibility of total loss due to duplication and free flows of ideas.
Although financial market integration as expressed by gF above promotes efficiency 
and removes the overinvestment-bound distortion typical of patent races, there still 
remains, of course, the distortion labelled “creative destruction” by Aghion and 
Howitt (1992), already commented at the end of section 2 above: From a firm’s 
point of view, and always taking the final good as numeraire, the return to a suc-
cessful innovation is
 
( )
1
*1
1t t
L LA
m
α−χ + π = χ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ α 
  (36)
While for society the variation in final good’s production brought about by an in-
novation, other things being constant, is
cation) effects. Of course, our negative allocation effect only happens because innovative agents are 
rational and foresee potential duplication of R&D efforts in the absence of financial integration. 
20 Meaningfully, Jones and Williamson (1999) call duplication “negative congestion externality”.
21 In Jones and Williamson (1999) there are constant returns to R&D from firms’ standpoint and decre-
asing returns from society’s standpoint. In Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1990) learning by doing model 
with spillovers the case is the opposite: decreasing returns to capital accumulation from the private 
point of view and constant from the society’s. In our setup, given the functional form ( ) 2f n n= ⋅ , 
there are (equally) decreasing returns from either standpoints. 
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 ( ) ( )
*1* 1 1t t t
L Ly y A
m
α
α−χ + ∆ + ∆ = − α ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ γ − ⋅ α 
 (37)
since
 
( ) ( )
1
1 ,     1t t t t t
t
y LA x A A
A m
−α
−α α∂  = − α ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∆ = γ − ⋅ ∂  
and by (8), (9) and (10) 
1
1
t t
Lx A
m
α−χ = ⋅ ⋅ α 
When χ is big, so that monopoly rents are high, and α is big, meaning by (1) that 
the technology level doesn’t matter much, the private return to innovation is higher 
than the social one. In particular, the term ( )1γ −  in (37) reveals that for society 
what counts is the productivity improvement, not rents transfers.
A final remark: the international pattern of specialization in R&D promoted by 
financial integration is completely arbitrary apart from the requirement that only 
one firm in the world be targeting each intermediate good to be quality-innovated. 
In the absence of any comparative advantage either in research or in production, 
there is no way to pin down which “type” of good is bound to be innovated by each 
country. Even more counterintuitive, each country’s R&D investment may fall on 
wildly disconnected sets, since there are no increasing returns to concentrate rese-
arch activity in “clusters” of intermediate goods. A nice alternative to this picture, 
rendering a clearly cut and homogeneous pattern of specialization in R&D is to 
assume intersectoral knowledge spillovers such that, for a continuum of goods, an 
independent innovation on intermediate good i happens with probability
 ( )
1i
i j
i
p i n n dj
−δ−σ+θ
δ β
−θ
 
= λ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
 
∫  (38)
where
 0 1   and   0 1< δ < < β <
θ  stands for the measure of the “cluster” of intermediate goods in which knowledge 
spillovers operate;
σ  merely controls for less than 1 homogeneity degree
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Under (38) and financial integration, potential innovators lying inside relatively 
more “populated” clusters will receive more resources, that being enough to “co-
ordinate” them. Notice, however, that the presence of positive spillovers entails a 
further coordination problem: there may be multiple symmetric Nash equilibria ni 
(nj≠i) and inefficient allocations in which the optimal use of resources to innovation 
on industry i is determined given the other industries’ investment levels, while it 
would pay off increasing investment in i if those levels were bigger, exactly as in 
Cooper and John (1988).22
6 conclusIons
Summarizing the results we got: When compared to a situation where a country is 
“isolated”, integration as free flows of ideas is likely to increase the growth rate, even 
if the amount of resources each country allocates to innovation on each good falls. 
When compared to this latter situation, integration via free trade of goods is likely 
to increase the growth rate through the “market size effect”, provided there is no 
trading partner with too low IPRs. Bringing “financial market integration” into the 
picture has two different effects on the growth rate: an unambiguously positive one 
through the selection of most efficient innovation technologies; an ambiguous one 
through eliminating redundancy: if the R&D activity was already too “congested” 
with duplication under free flows of ideas plus trade integration then the growth 
rate will increase; otherwise, it will be smaller under financial integration, but this 
will be in general welfare improving since we might expect an overall excess of in-
vestment to exist in the presence of patent races. 
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